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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of a multi—sector economy in which each
sector is characterized by a different type of wage or price stickiness.
The various sectors experience the same exogenous shocks and have the
same money supply. The analysis shows demand shocks pose no serious problems
for stabilization policy. In contrast, supply shocks force the policymaker
to choose between stability in one sector and stability in another. The
analysis also shows the economy cannot be usefully aggregated into a single
sector model. Such an aggregation misleads the economist as to the economy's
underlying structure and obscures the tradeoffs the policymaker must confront.
In particular, a feedback rule chosen on the basis of an aggregate model









Considerable controversy rages over how best to model the
wage—price mechanism in macroeconomic theory. It is
well-known that different assumptions about which markets
clear in an auction—like manner, which prices are "sticky," and
what form that stickiness takes, lead to important differences
in how model economies react to external shocks and to policy.
This debate is important. But, in a sense, it is also
arid since it seems most unlikely that there is one "correct"
model of the labor and product markets in any economy of
moderate complexity. For example some markets may behave like
auctions, some may have multi-period nominal contracts, others
may have multi-period real contracts, and so on.
We show in this paper that the variety of possible forms
of contracting poses problems for the econometrician and for
the policymaker that do not arise in models where all contracts
are of one type. And we show that these aggregation problems
are particularly severe in the presence of supply shocks.
2. Pure Economies
We view the economy as comprised of a number of distinct
sectors, each of which employs one type of labor and produces
a single, nonstorable output.1 In this section, we consider a
'If output is storable, additional complexities arise,
most of which are beside the point for present purposes. For
a look at some of these issues, see, among others, Blinder
(1981a, 1982).2.
variety of simple models of one—sector economies and derive
some elementary results which are later used in our discussion
of multi—sector economies. Each of our pure economies is
characterized by the following four equations:









m =logof the money stock
=logof the price level
=logof real output
log of employment
log of the real wage
Vtarandom demand shock (log of velocity)
=arandom supply shock
It is assumed that all parameters--a, b, c, and s--are positive
and that units are chosen to make the Walrasian equilibrium
values of each endogenous variable unity (hence its log is
zero) when the money supply is unity and the shocks v and
s are zero.This eliminates inessential constants from all
equations.
Equation (1) is the quantity theory of aggregate demand.
Complications having to do with interest rates and fiscal3.
policy are suppressed because they are tangential to the concerns
of the paper and would only cloud the issues.
Equation (2) is a production function; the shock s
is a stochastic productivity term indicative of such factors
as weather, technology, or oil prices. Equation (3) is the
labor demand function implied by the production function.
The log—linear forms of (2) and (3) are best viewed as approximations.
If the shock is exactly multiplicative, as (2) suggests, then
b = in (3).
Equation (4) is the labor supply function, which we
take to be non-stochastic for simplicity. In addition, we do
not distinguish between short-run and long—run wage elasticities
of labor supply, also for simplicity.
The remainder of this section considers five different pure
economies which close the above model with different assumptions
about which markets clear and which do not clear (and why).
The Type 1 Economy: Classical
In the Type 1 economy, the real wage and the price level
adjust instantly to clear the two markets. Equating yS =
and = , wecan derive the following solutions for










Henceforth, an asterisk indicates the Wairasianmarket—clearing
equilibrium value for any variable.
Naturally, the real variables (yw, and 9) are
independent of demand factors(mt and vt), and monetary policy
is, consequently, neutral. An adversesupply shock——a negative
value of st__lowers employment, output, and realwages below
their no—shock levels, and raises theprice level. Thus, even
in this simple classicaleconomy, an "energy shockt' leads to
many of the symptoms of stagflation. The one missingsymptom
is unemployment, since the labor marketalways clears.
The Type 2 Economy: Nominal Wage Contracts
The Type 2 economy differs in away that is usually
considered "Keynesian." Themoney wage, x, is set in advance,
making it possible that, at thiswage, the quantities of labor
supplied and demanded are not equal. Following Fischer(1977),
we assume that labor cedes to management theright to determine
the volume of employment ex post. So the labordemand equation
remains in force, while the laborsupply equation is replaced
by:
(4') w +Pt =x
To figure out howx is set, notice that employment
ex post will be:5.
=_b(xt_pt)
+
so that by (2) output will be:
=_ab(xt_pt)+ (l+a)s
and consequently by (1) the price level will be:'
Ptl+ab[mt + Vt + abxt -(l+a)st]
Suppose the nominal wage for period t is determined in
period t-j. Then, under rational expectations, the expected
value of Pt when the contract was written was:
t-jtl+ab t_mt
+jV÷ ab x (1





If we assume that the contract sets x so as to make this last
expression equal to the anticipated Wairasian equilibrium wage
as given by (7),2 then simple algebra establishes that:
- + ____________ X - t_mtt't + b+c t-j-
If this solution for the nominal wage is plugged back into the
previous expressions the following solutions emerge:
1The goods market is assumed to clearinstantly.
2A more sophisticated treatment would assume Pareto optimal
wage bargaining rather than expected market clearing.6.
2ab 1+a6 (10) =l+ab(z_t_zt) + 1+abt t_st) +
2 2 (11) Pt =z
—
(12)Wt =- l+abtt_5zt) + +
(13) =1+abtt_zt) + abt t_st) + t_jst
where, to economize on notation, we have defined a new variable:
(iLl.) z Sm + Vt
The intuition behind these equations is straightforward.
A fully anticipated change in aggregate demand(z =t_zt)
and a fully anticipated supply shock(St = havethe
same effects as in the classical model because, at the time of
the contract, the nominal wage adjusts fully to anticipated
events.
However, unanticipated changes in demand have real effects——
for the usual reasons. An unanticipated drop in demand, for
example, will make prices lower than expected at the time of
the contract. With a contractual nominal wage, this means
that the real wage will be higher than expected and, consequently,
employment and real output will be lower than expected.
An unanticipated decline in productivity lowers both output
and real wages. However, the effect on employment is ambiguous
because two conflicting forces are at work: the lower marginal
product of labor reduces the quantity of labor demanded, but
the lower real wage increases
11n the case of a multiplicative shock (b), employment
is unaffected.7.
Because of the sticky wage, unanticipated shocks cause
disequilibrium in the labor market. For convenience, define
the unemployment rate as - .Then,using the solution
equations (12) and (13) and the labor supply function ('-t),
wecompute that:
S D (b+c) b+c—(1—ac) (15) £ -l+ab(z -t_zt)
+l+ab
Clearly, an unanticipated drop in demand causes unemployment.
An unanticipated drop in productivity has an ambiguous effect
on unemployment. In the special multiplicative case (b), the
coefficient of -t-j5-tis c >0,so adverse shocks
reduce unemployment. (Employment is fixed while notional
labor supply falls.)
The Type 3 Economy: Nominal Price Contracts
Goods as well as labor are
often supplied at nominal prices determined in advance. In the
Type 3 economy, the wage is free to adjust, but the nominal
price level is set in advance by a contract. Specifically,
firms are assumed to commit themselves to supply whatever
quantity consumers demand at a pre—set price, p, and to hire
whatever labor is necessary to make good on this cominitment)
Thus, returning to the original system (l)-(), equations (1),
(2), and (Lt)continueto hold, but (3) is replaced by:
'In a more complicated model with inventories, firms would
presumably use inventory draw—downs and buildups to buffer
production from fluctuations in demand.8.
D
= ______ t a
The wage rate is assumed to move so as to equate = =
andfirms are assumed always to produce the quantity demanded
S D so y y y
To complete the model, we must determine the contractual
price level. We assume that firms at time t—j set prices that
they expect will clear the market at time t .Ifthe pre—set
price level is firmswill (rationally) expect to sell:
t_jytt.jzt —Pt
To produce this much output,
labor demand will have to satisfy (3'), and hence, according





Firms will pick p to make this expected real wage








Solving for the requisite gives:
(16) p —_-
andfrom this the rest of the solution follows:9.
(17) z - +
-j5t
18) -— t—jt t —t—jt+ S t a a b+c t-jt
z—.zS —.5
'19) -tt-j t tt—jt+ -—
ac ac b+c t-jt
Once again, the effects of fully anticipated shocks are
the same as in the classical model, and for the same reason.
An unanticipated demand shock cannot raise the price level,
which is predetermined, and so instead raises output, employment,
and the wage rate (both nominal and real).
The effects of an unanticipated drop in productivity are
interesting in this model. Because the price level is pre-
determined, aggregate demand is unaffected by such a shock.
And, since the obverse of Say's law holds in this economy
(demand creates its own supply), output cannot be affected
(see equation (17)). Employment must rise to compensate for
the drop in productivity (equation (18)), and real wages must
rise to attract the requisite volume of employment (equation (19)).
There is no unemployment. These are not the sort of reactions
usually thought to characterize an energy shock.10.
The Type 4 Economy: Real Wage Contracts
The Type 4 economy is extremely simple to analyze, and is
sometimes thought to characterize advanced European economies.1
Wages are assumed to be fully indexed, and the real wage to
prevail in period t is set in period t-j .However,the
price level is assumed to adjust to clear the goods market.
As usual, we assume thatw is set at its expected
Wairasian market-clearing level which, by (7) is:
4 .. (20)w
Aswas the case in the Type 2 economy, the wage is
predetermined and the firm gets to select the level of
employment. Hence we suspend the labor supply function and









Output then follows directly from the production function:
(22) y =(l+a)(st
- +Yt_jst
and the price level adjusts to make consumers demand this much
output:




Inthis model, there are no nominal rigidities, and so
changes in aggregate demand cannot affect any real variables.
Money is again neutral. If an unanticipated drop in
productivity—--an "energy shock"——occurs, the real wage is
fixed, and so labor supply is also fixed. But labor demand
declines-—see equation (21), and so there is unemployment.
Specifically, unemployment is:
(2) LS -"St —
Asalways, an energy shock lowers output and raises prices.
The Type 5 Economy: Both Wage and Price Contracts
The Type 5 economy is a hybrid in which neither wages nor
prices are free to clear markets; both are predetermined by
contracts. It is immaterial whether we consider the labor
contract to fix the nominal wage or the real wage; since the
price level is also fixed, the two amount to the same thing.
For convenience of exposition, we will consider the Type S
economy to be a combination of Type 3 (fixed price level) and
Type 4 (fixed real wage). Hence the price level is given by
(16):
5 3 (25) Pt =_t
—_jSt12.
while the real wage is given by (20):
5 L (26)w w. =
Inthis economy, we imagine that firms agree to provide whatever
quantity is demanded at the predetermined price level, and
workers agree to supply enough labor to produce this quantity
at the predetermined real wage. Thus it follows directly from
(1) that output is:
(27) y (z -zt)
+
1t-j5t
and it follows directly from (2) that employment is:




Inthis hybrid economy, unanticipated demand
shocks do affect real output and employment (they cannot affect
the real wage, which is predetermined) because of nominal
rigidities. Unanticipated supply shocks cannot affect wages
or prices, which are predetermined. Instead, an energy shock
lowers output and raises employment (see equations (27) and
(28)). Since, under a fixed real wage, notional labor supply
is unaffected, an unanticipated energy shock here ca.uses
over—employment, viz.:
S D1 1
(29) 9.—9. (s — — — (z—13.
Summary
The preceding analyses of the five types of economies can
be easily summarized for future reference. The deviation of
output from its Walrasian equilibrium level ("natural rate")





wherethe coefficients and depend on the type of
economy Ci) and are given in Table 1. Analogously, the






wherethe coefficients X' and A1 are as indicated in Table 2. z S
Finally,the rate of unanticipated inflation (we assume that
anticipated inflation is costless, and hence of no concern)
takes the form:




whereTable 3 gives the relevant coefficients for each economy.
3. Policy Reactions to Demand Shocks
It is probably transparent from the structure of the model
that the policymaker's problem is trivial when demand shocks
occur. This section shows that optimal monetary policy will
fully offset anticipated movements in velocity.l'4.
TABLE1
Effects of Shocks on Output
Economy Type Demand Shock ()SupplyShock ()





3. Nominal Price 1 -y<0
Contracts
it. Real Wage Contracts 0 1 +aB—Y >0
5. Both Wage and Price
1 —y<0 Contracts
TABLE 2
Effects of Shocks on Unemployment
Economy Type Demand Shock (A) Supply Shock (X')
1. Classical 0 0





it. Real Wage Contracts 0 — <0
5. Both Wage and Price -1
< Contracts a
TABLE 3
Effects of Shocks on Unanticipated Inflation
Economy Type Demand Shock (r) Supply Shock (r)
1. Classical 1 —y<0
2. Nominal Wage 1 l+a Contracts l+ab
>0 —l+ab
<0
3. Nominal Price Contracts 0 0
4. Real Wage Contracts 1 —(l+a)<0
5. Both Wage and Price Contracts 0 015.
For this section only, assume that all movements in
productivity are fully anticipated so that s - = 0
every period. Suppose the monetary authority is planning to
use a lagged feedback rule of the form:
=—g
and wants to choose g so as to minimize the variance of
around y .Underthe assumed policy rule, z —
canbe written:




To simplify the notation, denote the first term by n.•
It indicates the new information about velocity
that the monetary authority has, but that was not available
to labor and management when they wrote contracts at time t—j.





and using (30) it follows immediately that:
11f contracts are only one period long (j=l), there is no
information and no stabilization is possible.16.
In Type 1 (classical) or Type -t(realwage rigidity)
economies, is zero and this expression is zero regardless
of monetary policy. Money is neutral in these economies. In
any of the other three types of economies, the variance of
output around the natural rate is minimized by setting g1,
that is, by offsetting fully any anticipated fluctuations in
velocity.1
The important point note is that full offset is
optimal regardless of the numerical value of .Furthermore,
referring to equations (31) and (32)
and Tables 2 and 3, we see that the variance of either
unemployment or unanticipated inflation, where nonzero, is
always strictly proportional to the variance of unanticipated
demand. Hence gl is always the optimal stabilization policy,
regardless of the specific goals or coefficients involved.
This rule (gl) is a familiar one. It implies that
+ Vt) 0 ,andhence by (1) that t-lt + p) 0
In words, the policy is to try to stabilize nominalGNP.2
The main finding of this section, however, is that insofar
as demand shocks are concerned, the policymaker need not worry
about which type of economy he is trying to stabilize. Every
11fvwere observed before m has tobe set, the monetary
authority would offset v - aswell.
2Recall, however, that only demand shocks have been
considered so far.17.
variance with which he is concerned is either zero regardless
of what he does,1 or is minimized by setting g1 .Consequently,
if the economy is composed of a variety of sectors which have
but experience the same shocks,
different types of contracts /the optimal demand-management
policy for any one sector (g1) will also be optimal for all
the others. As we shall see in the next section, this happy
circumstance evaporates when there are supply shocks.
Lj.PolicyResponses to Supply Shocks
In this section, we turn to supply shocks and, for simplicity,
assume that v 0 every period.2 Hence we can replace the
variable z byni, so output is given by:
(30') -= '(m-t_mt)
+ -
Considermonetary feedback rules of the form:
mt
-t—lt





(33) y -y(st - + ( -
Aswe did in the last section, call the first term the innovation,
1This statement leans heavily on the notion that anticipated
inflation is costless, so policymakers are not concerned with
the variance of Pt
2The previous section shows that this assumption is
inessential.18.
e ,andthe second term the new information,u .Itfollows
from (33) that:
(3L.) E(y —f.)2 (p1)'2 2 + —
whichis minimized by setting:
4j±
Thisdefines the optimal setting of for output stabilization
so long as is not zero.'
Specifically, in a Type 2 economy (nominal wage rigidity),
the optimal feedback parameter is:
(35?)
-l+a13—y(l+ab)l+ab 11+a— =l+ab
2) 2 - ab abl+ab ab
which is of indeterminate sign in general. Notice, however,
that '2 has the same sign as the effect of the supply shock
on output ().Inthe case we normally think of, where output
falls below the natural rate in response to an "energy shock,"
the optimal monetary policy is to increase the money supply,
that is, to accommodate the shock. In the other case, where
output falls less than the natural rate after an energy shock,
the optimal policy is to decrease the money supply.
1As Table 1 shows, is zero in Type 1 and Type
economies. In these economies money is neutral, and there is
no possibility of a monetary stabilization policy.19.
The optimal monetary policy is the same in Type 3 (nominal
price contracts) and Type 5 (both wage and price contracts)
economies, and is defined by:
(35") S3 —< 0
In these economies, output does not fall after an energy shock
(though the natural rate does), so it is optimal to contract
the money supply in order to lower output.
In brief, if stabilization of output around its natural rate
is the goal, the only possibility for an accommodating monetary
policy to be optimal arises in an economy with rigid nominal
wages, and even here is is only a possibility, not a certainty.1
Other stabilization goals lead to somewhat different optimal
policies. If the authorities wish to stabilize the unemployment
rate around zero, for example, policy is fruitless in Type 1,
3, and 1l.economies.In Types 1 (classical) and 3 (rigid prices),
unemployment never arises. In Type 4 (rigid real wages),
unemployment is possible but monetary policy is powerless to
do anything about it. An analysis identical to that just done
for output stabilization shows that unemployment stabilization
leads to the same optimal policy rule (cSgivenby (35')) in
a Type 2 economy (rigid nominal wages), whereas the optimal
policy in a Type 5 economy (rigid wages and prices) is now
—1, that is, ni .Decreasesin
1This issue is treated in greater depth in Blinder (198lb),
where it is suggested that stabilization around the "natural
rate" might not be optimal if supply shocks are transitory.20.
productivity thus call for equiproportionate declines
in the money supply.
A parallel analysis can be conducted when the objective
is to minimize the variance of unanticipated inflation. In
economies of Type 3 (rigid prices) or Type 5 (rigid prices and
wages), the issue does not arise because unanticipated inflation
is impossible. In any of the other types, inflation stabilization
naturally calls for a reduction in the money supply when
productivity declines.
Obviously, more complex stabilization objectives--such as
weighted averages of the three variances already considered--can
be handled in the usual way. The optimal policy will depend
on the welfare weights attached to output, unemployment and
unanticipated inflation, and will differ across economy types.
In a Type 2 economy (nominal wage rigidity), the optimal monetary
response to an adverse supply shock might be accommodative.
In each of the other economy types, however, some contraction
of the money supply following an energy shock is optimal.
The most important point for our purposes, however, is
that the optimal policy response to a supply shock is different
in each of the five pure economies. This stands in stark
contrast to the case of demand shocks, where the same policy
(full offset) was optimal for all.
5. An Archipelago Economy
Real economies are not of any of our five pure forms.
They consist of a variety of interrelated markets characterized21.
by a variety of contracts of different types and different
lengths. To model such a complex economy in full detail is an
intractable task. However, it is possible to construct a rather
simple model economy which nonetheless includes a variety of
contract forms.
Consider an archipelago economy consisting of N islands.
Each island has one labor market and one goods market, like
one of our pure economies, and is isolated from the others.
Neither goods nor labor can move from one island to another.
However, the islands form a single economy in that they experience
the same monetary policy (mt) and the same shocks (v and st).
We know that velocity shocks are easily handled; so ignore
them. And assume that the government of this archipelago
economy wishes to minimize the variance of outputaround the
natural rate. Output relative to the natural rate on each
island is given by (30?), and so aggregate output in the
archipelago is:'
(36) -= [ +CE
+ '
where is the weight of each type of island in the total
economy.
1AficiQnados of rational expectations models are used to
playing fast and loose with Jensen?s inequality and sowill
not mind defining national product as the sum of the logs
of output on the individual islands.22.
Similar aggregate equations can be derived for the models
other variables, and some have interesting implications.
Consider, for example, the cyclical behavior of real wages in
a world of demand shocks only. On a Type 1 (classical) island,
neither w nor display any cyclical fluctuation. On a
Type 2 (rigid money wage) island, positive demand shocks raise
output and lower real wages; the real wage is countercyclical.
On a Type 3 (rigid prices) island, an increase in demand raises
both output and real wages; real wages move procyclically.
On islands of Type Lj.(rigidreal wages) or Type S (rigid prices
and wages), shocks do not change the real wage. Hence, in the
archipelago economy, there is no a priori prediction about the
cyclical covariation of real wages and output.
Let us concentrate, however, on equation (36) for output.
Notice that it has a form identical to equation (30') for a
pure economy. Consequently, a macroeconomist might build a
theoretical model with a single aggregate labor market and a
single aggregate goods market, based on one of the pure contract
types considered in Section 2.If the weights, 9., were
reasonably constant over time, he would obtain good results
when estimating equation (36), and be led to conclude that
aggregation did not greatly distort reality. However, we
know that the archipelago economy cannot really be aggregated.23.
At any point in time, some labor markets may be on their
notional supply curves, some may be on their notional demand
curves, some may be on both, and some may be on neither.That
the aggregate output equation is similar to the output equation
for a single sector does not imply that aggregation across
markets is permissible.
If the weights attached to the different types of islands
were changing through time, the equation would show symptoms
of "parameter drift." This explanation of parameter drift
is an alternative to, but in no sense denies or excludes,
Lucas' (1976) famous explanation of the same phenomenon.
Stabilization policy in the face of supply shocks poses
even more formidable problems.1 Even if we assume that every
island in the archipelago has the same structural parameters
(a, b, c, and ) and experiences identical supply shocks
our previous analysis has taught as that policies which are
optimal for one type of island may not be optimal for an island
that handles contracts differently. The directions of the
optimal policies might even differ. Hence policymakers have
to face up to a new kind of tradeoff in addition to the usual
tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment, between internal
and external balance, etc.--a tradeoff between stability on one
island and stability on another. A proper approach to the
stabilization problem may require the policymaker to assign
relative welfare weights to stability on the various islands.
But what if these differences among islands are not recognized,
or thought unimportant? We just suggested that an econometrician
might mistakenly believe that the archipelago can be aggregated
1As noted earlier, stabilization of demand shocks in the
archipelago economy remains simple.2.
into a single goods market and a single labor market. He
might offer his estimates )f the aggregated economy to the
policymaker, who might use them in the design of an "optimaltt
policy. Will such a procedure lead to disaster? Maybe and
maybe not. In the remainder of this section we offer two
examples of archipelago economies that illustrate some of
the possibilities.
First Example
In our first example, the "optimal" policy calculated
under the mistaken assumption that aggregation is permissible
is nonetheless stabilizing on every island. The archipelago
consists of a Type 2 island (nominal wage contracts) and a
Type 3 island (nominal price contracts) of equal size, with
b13c .Hencethe two output equations are:
2 .,. ab ab, - =l+ab(mt -t_mt)
-—
-
3 ... ab m — .m—(1+ —-)(St
—.s) YtY4tt—jt it
While both islands require contractionaTi2Y monetarypolicy
following a supply shock, the quantitativedimensions of the
l+ab












It turns out that, with this stabilization rule, the
variance of output on each island is:
2 i 2 2 ab 2 1 2 2
E(yt—y) °e + l+2ab 'u i-2,3
whereas with no stabilization policy it would be:




2 3 2 2 ab 2 2
E(yt—y) = °e
+(1+—) a
on island 3.Thus, in this example, though the two types of
island have rather different individually-optimal stabilization
policies, a common policy which is "second-best" on all islands
is nevertheless better than nothing.
Second Example
Things are quite different in our second example, in which
the stabilization policy believed to be optimal for the aggregated
economy actually destabilizes some islands while stabilizing
none. To construct this example, we assume that the archipelago
consistsof a Type 2 island and a' Type 'tisland.We again
assume b, but now assume inelastic labor supply (c=O).
On the Type 2 island, output is given by:
ab =l+ab(m_tmt)
and so with no stabilization policy (and no demand shocks),
the variance of output would be zero. On the Type [4island,
output is:26.
-yab(s -
sothat with or without stabilization policy,
E(y -y) (ab) +a)






Ifthis equation is used to design policy, the allegedly
"optimal" stabilization rule will be thought to be:
6 =l+ab
Straightforward calculations show that, with this choice of 5
the variance of output on island 2 will be:
2 2 2 E(y -y)
=(ab)a
A totally passive monetary policy (6=0) is clearly
optimal for this economy because 6=0 is optimal on island 2.
and 6 is irrelevant on island .Butan economist using the
aggregate equation would design a "stabilization" policy that
actually offsets declines in production (due to supply shocks)
on island Lwithrises in production (due to demand stimulus)
on island 2.27.
These examples do not exhaust the possibilities. We
have also developed an example in which the "optimal" policy
for the aggregated economy stabilizes output on some islands
but destabilizes output on others. The only general conclusion
is that there is no general conclusion. In an archipelago
economy, stabilization policy for supply shocks that is designed
on the (false) assumption of a single labor market and a single
goods market may be unambiguously helpful, unambiguously
harmful, or a or eacn!
6. The Structure of Contracts
In what has been said so far, the type and duration of
contracts has been taken as fixed. But
in the long run the type or duration of contracts
observed in an economy may well depend on the policy rule being
followed. For example, consider an island choosing between
real, wage contracts and nominal wage contracts. As is well—known,
with only supply shocks, agents will refer nominal wge
contracts; and with only velocity shocks, they will prefer
real wage contracts.' However, if both types of shocks are
present, the choice will depend on the relative variances of
the two types of shocks and on the stabilization policy
that agents expect. A change in stabilization policy can, in
principle, lead to a change in the contract structure.
7.Summary
Real world economies probably consist of many sectors which
handle contracts differently. As a consequence, important
1See Gray c976 ).28.
variables like output, prices, real wages, and employment may
respond differently in different sectors even if all sectors
experience the same external shocks.
Despite these differenees, the optimal policy response to
a purely nominal disturbance is the same in every sector: the
money supply should fully offset any anticipated movement in
velocity so as to stabilize expected nominal income completely.
But things are much more complicated where supply shocks
are concerned. The optimal policy response to a supply shock
is different in different sectors. Quantitative differences
in the optimal policy are to be expected; qualitative
differences are possible. A stabilization policy which appears
optimal when the economy is (wrongly) aggregated may (but need
not) actually destabilize some sectors.
Finally, whereas this paper emphasizes how the form of
contracting influences the optimal stabilization policy,
the choice of stabilization policy may also affect
the choice of contract type.29.
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